

DS


679

W77



Class US679

Book .W77



RECEIVED
JAN 17 1903

JAN 17 1903
D. of D.

5-7 Cong
1st Sess

Senate

Doc
No. 5

HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICY.

PREFATORY NOTE.—Prof. Theodore S. Woolsey, in an article on "Our relations with China," printed April 28, 1900, recalled that—

The importance of retaining the Philippines, when the treaty of peace with Spain was being negotiated, and later when its ratification was in question, was urged not only on account of their own fertility and resources, but also and particularly because their fortunate situation would aid this country in extending its trade with China.

No one can understand the genesis of the Philippines acquisition by the United States who does not recall to mind the Chinese situation in the fall of 1897 and the winter of 1897-98. For, as Professor Woolsey has intimated, China furnished the chief motive for the McKinley Administration's Philippine policy.

In his annual message to Congress, December 5, 1898, President McKinley said:

The United States has not been an indifferent spectator of the extraordinary events transpiring in the Chinese Empire whereby portions of its maritime provinces are passing under the control of various European powers.

Those events are worth recalling. On October 18, 1897, the news was telegraphed over the world that the Russian fleet had entered Port Arthur with the intention of wintering there. In November, 1897, some German missionaries were murdered by Chinese in the province of Shantung, with the result that the German Government took forcible possession at once of Kiao Chou Bay, and then secured, by coercion of the Chinese Government, a ninety-nine years' lease of the same, and practically established a protectorate over Shantung Province. The United States Government was officially informed by Minister Denby, in a dispatch dated March 29, 1898, that a convention had been signed between Russia and China by which Port Arthur and Taliénwan were ceded to Russia under a lease; and earlier still, on March 9, 1898, the Government was informed by Minister Denby of the terms of the settlement between Germany and China regarding Kiao Chou Bay.

A dispatch from Mr. Denby, dated April 5, 1898, stated that China had ceded Weihaiwei to Great Britain, and on April 20, 1898, Mr. Denby informed the Washington Government concerning the French occupation of Kwangchow Bay. All this information reached Washington in official form before the outbreak of the Spanish war (see diplomatic correspondence concerning China in House Doc. No. 1. Fifty-fifth Congress, third session), but the main facts were in the newspapers and before the public, in their most important bearings upon the status of China, as early as the autumn of 1897 and the winter of 1897-98. The threatened partition of China was a conspicuous topic of discussion during those months among publicists, statesmen,

and diplomats. The commercial interests of the United States in China were repeatedly pointed out. The New York Tribune, on January 1, 1898, said editorially:

The United States, too, has great interest in China and hopes to have greater when the annexation of Hawaii and the laying of the telegraphic cable shall have helped this country into the dominant rank in Pacific commerce to which it is naturally entitled.

There was even talk of going to war to prevent China's dismemberment by protectionist powers. Senator Teller, of Colorado, in an interview January 3, 1898, said:

It is our duty to prevent the dismemberment of China. We should join with Great Britain in a notice to Russia and Germany that dismemberment will not be permitted.

Thus the general oriental question was in the minds of the ruling statesmen of America in the winter preceding the Spanish war. The Administration, as President McKinley said later on to Congress, was not an "indifferent spectator" of the important events that took place on the coast of Asia. Meanwhile, our relations with Spain concerning Cuba concentrated public attention, and these relations were growing more acute. In the same month, November, 1897, that German war-ships entered Kiao Chou Bay the Government at Washington had been pointedly reminded of the interesting relation that existed between the Chinese question and the Cuban question through Spain's sovereignty in the Philippine Islands, an archipelago lying off the Chinese coast.

On November 3, 1897, Consul-General Wildman, at Hongkong, called the attention of the Department of State to an offer of an alliance that had been made by Agoncillo, agent of the Filipino insurgent junta, the alliance to be between the Philippine republic and the United States in the event of a war between the United States and Spain. (See p. 333, Senate Document No. 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, third session.) This offer was declined by the United States Government in a dispatch by Mr. Cridler to Consul-General Wildman, dated December 15, 1897. The correspondence is important as showing that some five months, at least, before the outbreak of war with Spain our Government realized the delicate situation in the Philippines, and was also considering Philippine affairs at a time when the Chinese question was stirring the public mind of Europe, America, and Japan. It may also be asserted that the Washington Administration was at that early date also considering the possibilities of a military campaign in the Philippines, for in McClure's Magazine of October, 1899, Governor Roosevelt, who was Assistant Secretary of the Navy prior to the Spanish war, wrote as follows:

It has been said that it was a mere accident that Dewey happened to be in command of the Asiatic Squadron when the war with Spain broke out. This is not the fact. He was sent to command it in the fall of 1897 because, "to use the very language employed at the time, it was deemed wise to have there a man 'who could go into Manila if necessary.'"

Having sketched the background in the Far East as it appeared to the Administration in the autumn of 1897 and the winter of 1897-98, we may now review the successive steps in the actual development of the policy of conquest and territorial acquisition in the Philippines.

1.

Explosion of the *Maine* in Habana Harbor, February 15, 1898.

2.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, Secretary Long being absent from duty, on February 25, 1898, sent a dispatch to Commodore Dewey, on the Asiatic Squadron, in which he said:

Order the squadron, except *Monocacy*, to Hongkong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the Philippine Islands.

[NOTE.—So far as is known this dispatch to Commodore Dewey, sent two months before the declaration of war, was the first sent by the United States Government with regard to a conquest of the Philippine Islands. Its historical importance is evident since it proves that an offensive campaign in the Archipelago was early planned to follow the destruction of the Spanish fleet.]

3.

Commodore Dewey, March 31, 1898, cabled from Hongkong to Washington:

About 15,000 soldiers of all arms in all the islands, of which the majority are in the vicinity of Manila. The islands are now in a state of insurrection and my informants state that even Spanish soldiers, which constitute only a small part of the whole, are disaffected. Both ships and ports are in need of ammunition. I believe I am not overconfident in stating that with the squadron now at my command the vessels could be taken and the defenses of Manila reduced in one day. There is every reason to believe that with Manila taken, or even blockaded, the rest of the islands would fall either to the insurgents or ourselves, as they are only held through the support of the navy and are dependent upon Manila for supplies. Information has just reached me that there are 5,000 armed rebels in camp near Manila who are ready to assist us.

[NOTE.—This dispatch shows that Commodore Dewey, several weeks before war began, was placing bright assurances before the Government at Washington of a conquest of the archipelago that should take place after a naval battle. This dispatch is in harmony with the February instructions of the Government to the Commodore; it also foreshadows cooperation with the Filipino insurgents against Spain. It is worth noting, too, that the Government, after the receipt of this dispatch, sent no word to Dewey cautioning him to limit his operations to establishing control of the sea. Meanwhile let us observe the course of the diplomatic correspondence between the Washington Government and its minister at Madrid, Gen. Stewart L. Woodford, bearing, at the same time, Dewey's dispatch of March 31 in mind. On that same day, March 31, Minister Woodford cabled to the President:

Spanish pride will not permit the ministry to propose and offer an armistice (to the Cuban insurgents) which they really desire. * * * The ministry have gone as far as they dare to-day.

On April 3 Minister Woodford wrote to Washington:

The Spanish minister for foreign affairs assures me that Spain will go as far and as fast as she can. The Austrian ambassador * * * says that he will guarantee that Spain will do this.

The diplomatic correspondence (House Document No. 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, third session) shows that the Spanish Government was moving as rapidly as possible to meet American demands regarding Cuba, and were delaying in the matter of the armistice in order not

to outrun the movement of Spanish public opinion. Only a few days, however, were required for Spain to meet the Washington Government regarding the armistice which Secretary Day had suggested, and this was to be done in a way shrewdly calculated to gain the support of a Catholic people like the Spaniards. On April 5 Minister Woodford cabled to the President:

Should the Queen proclaim the following before 12 o'clock noon of Wednesday, April 6, will you sustain the Queen, and can you prevent hostile action by Congress?

"At the request of the Holy Father, in this Passion Week, and in the name of Christ, I proclaim immediate and unconditional suspension of hostilities in the island of Cuba.

"This suspension is to become immediately effective so soon as accepted by the insurgents in that island, and is to continue for the space of six months, to the 5th day of October, 1898.

"I do this to give time for passions to cease, and in the sincere hope and belief that during this suspension permanent and honorable peace may be obtained between the insular government and those of my subjects who are now in rebellion against the authority of Spain. I pray the blessing of heaven upon this truce of God, which I now declare in His name and with the sanction of the Holy Father of all Christendom."

Please read this in the light of all my previous telegrams and letters. I believe that this means peace, which the sober judgment of our people will approve long before November, and which must be approved at the bar of history.

The reply to Minister Woodford, sent that same night, was remarkably cool and unresponsive, being as follows:

The President highly appreciates the Queen's desire for peace. He can not assume to influence the action of the American Congress beyond the discharge of his constitutional duty in transmitting the whole matter to them with such recommendations as he deems necessary and expedient. * * * If armistice is offered by the Government of Spain the President will communicate that fact to Congress. The President's message will go to Congress to-morrow. It will recount the conditions in Cuba. * * * He will not advise the recognition of the independence of the insurgents, but will recommend measures looking to the cessation of hostilities.

The important point in this connection is that this virtual breaking off of negotiations with Madrid for a peaceable solution of the Cuban problem (as was clearly implied in the announcement to General Woodford that the President's war message would go to Congress the next day, despite Spain's effort to meet American demands regarding an armistice) followed Dewey's dispatch of March 31 painting brightly the prospects of an easy conquest of the Philippines within five days. The inference is that Dewey's dispatch regarding the easy Philippine conquest had direct effect upon Washington diplomacy and made strongly for war.]

4.

Meeting at Singapore between United States Consul-General Pratt and Emilio Aguinaldo, April 24, 1898. On the same day Mr. Pratt cabled to Dewey at Hongkong:

Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come to Hongkong arrange with Commodore general cooperation insurgents Manila, if desired. Telegraph.

On the same day Dewey answered:

Tell Aguinaldo to come soon as possible.

[NOTE.—In a cable to Secretary Day, dated April 27, 1898, Consul-General Pratt said:

General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey cooperation insurgents Manila.

On April 28, the next day, Mr. Pratt wrote to Secretary Day:

I think that in arranging for his [Aguinaldo's] direct cooperation with the commander of our forces I have prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

Now, although Aguinaldo was in Hongkong as late as May 17, the Washington Government, already informed by Mr. Pratt of the new relations between Commodore Dewey and Aguinaldo, made no effort to prevent the Filipino leader from being transported to Luzon on an American ship and under American auspices.]

5.

Cable from Secretary Long to Commodore Dewey, April 24, 1898:

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.

[NOTE.—This dispatch is notable in one respect. It implies that the "operations" to be begun are more comprehensive than the capture or destruction of the Spanish fleet. Thus it is in entire harmony with the instructions sent to Dewey February 25 and with Dewey's conception of the conquest of the archipelago, after having fought the sea fight.]

6.

War with Spain officially declared April 26, 1898.

7.

Battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, in which Spanish sea power in the Orient is annihilated.

8.

General Miles, on May 3, 1898, immediately upon receiving the news of Dewey's naval victory, writes to the Secretary of War recommending that some 5,000 troops, under command of Gen. T. M. Anderson, "be sent to occupy the Philippine Islands." On May 4, 1898, the President approves General Miles's recommendation, as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, May 4, 1898.

The troops designated by General Miles, if approved by the Secretary of War, should be assembled at San Francisco, Cal., for such service as may be ordered hereafter.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

9.

On May 16, 1898, after seeing Commodore Dewey's dispatch of May 13, General Miles makes a second recommendation, increasing the size of the army to be sent to the Philippines, "in order to make the United States forces as strong and effective as possible, with a view to its maintaining our possession and our flag on the Philippine Islands."

10.

On May 17, 1898, Gen. Wesley Merritt, who had been appointed commander of the military force to be sent to the Philippines, writes to the War Department, protesting that the force to be given him is—

Unsuited to the ends to be accomplished and insufficient in efficiency * * * when the work to be done consists of conquering a territory 7,000 miles from our

base, defended by a regularly trained and acclimated army of from 10,000 to 25,000 men and inhabited by 14,009,000 people, the majority of whom will regard us with intense hatred born of race and religion.

11.

The President communicates his instructions to General Merritt on May 19, beginning as follows:

The destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, * * * the paroling of the garrisons, and acquisition of the control of the bay, have rendered it necessary * * * to send an army of occupation to the Philippines for the two fold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States.

[NOTE.—The foregoing letters and memoranda by Generals Miles and Merritt and the President are significant of this, namely, that when the news of Dewey's expected naval victory was received in Washington there was no hesitation whatever displayed, either by the General Commanding the Army or by the President himself, in proceeding at once to the next step—the military occupation of the Philippines—which had been first distinctly foreshadowed in the February instructions to Dewey. It is evident also that General Merritt's earliest idea of his own work was that of a conquest. The President's own instructions to Merritt show that at that date, May 19, he did not regard Dewey's naval victory as effecting a conquest of the islands, for he describes Merritt's task as "completing the reduction of the Spanish power," which is a recognition of the fact that the army was necessary to destroy the Spanish power in the archipelago after the navy had done its work.

Gen. R. A. Alger. Secretary of War during the Spanish-American war, says in his recently published book, on page 326:

Although the determination to send an army of occupation to the Philippines was reached before Dewey's victory occurred, and orders for assembling volunteers at San Francisco with this object in view had been given as early as May 4, the news of the success of Manila Bay greatly hastened the preparations for this army.

✓ This statement proves conclusively that the design of sending an army of conquest to the Philippines existed in the Administration prior to Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, and it demolishes utterly the contention, which apologists for the Administration have made, that there was no thought of acquiring, conquering, or occupying the islands until the naval battle unexpectedly placed Manila in our power.]

12.

Aguinaldo lands at Cavite from the U. S. S. *McCulloch*, May 19, 1898.

13.

Aguinaldo issues proclamation to Filipinos, May 24, 1898, prohibiting conduct by them contrary to the laws of war.

14.

Secretary Long cables to Dewey "not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future," May 26, 1898.

[NOTE.—This dispatch is consistent with the original determination of the United States Government to effect a conquest of the Philippines, or some portion of them.]

15.

Insurgents isolate Luzon from other islands as early as June 2, and on June 5 they form a circle around Manila, "thus effectually cutting us off from every means of relief." (Testimony of Spanish General Jaudenes.)

16.

Aguinaldo issues proclamation organizing a military government, June 18, 1898.

17.

Aguinaldo issues proclamation establishing an independent revolutionary government June 23, 1898, and on same day issues a message to foreign powers, including United States, announcing establishment of that government.

18.

First American troops, under General Anderson, land at Cavite, June 30, 1898.

19.

General Anderson, July 4, 1898, writes to Aguinaldo asking that "your people cooperate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces."

20.

Filipino republic proclaimed July 3, 1898.

[NOTE.—During this period the United States Government, while being fully informed, made no protest against the course of Aguinaldo in establishing and proclaiming to the world an independent republic.]

21.

Captain Coghlan, commanding the *Raleigh* and *Concord*, on July 7, 1898, takes Grande Island, in Subig Bay, and turns the Spanish garrison over to Aguinaldo to be kept as prisoners of war. By this act Admiral Dewey treated Aguinaldo as a civilized combatant and also treated him as an ally, since the act in question took place after Aguinaldo's proclamation of the establishment of an independent native government.

22.

Gen. Wesley Merritt, American commander in chief of the Philippine expedition, arrives at Cavite, July 25, 1898.

[NOTE.—General Merritt refrained from the day of his arrival from direct relations with Aguinaldo, whose force had encircled the city and hemmed in the Spanish garrison. See General Merritt's official report, dated August 31, 1898, in which he says:

As my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by American land forces and stated that the powers of the military occupants are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila.]

23.

Upon the request of the American generals Aguinaldo withdraws his forces from the sea beach and the "Callo Real" on July 29, so that American troops under Greene could move against the city.

24.

Aguinaldo, August 6, issues an appeal to the foreign powers for the recognition of the belligerency and the independence of the Philippine revolutionary government.

25.

General Merritt and Rear-Admiral Dewey, on August 9, make a formal demand on Spanish general for the surrender of Manila, in which they point out to him that the city is "surrounded in all parts" "by a constantly harassing force."

[NOTE.—The phrase "surrounded in all parts" contained a reference to the insurgents, who held the Spaniards closely invested, except where, on request, they had yielded their positions at one or two points to the American troops. This shows that the American commanders used the fact of the insurgents' military position to influence the Spanish general to surrender.]

26.

Peace protocol between Spain and the United States, signed at Washington August 12, 1898.

27.

After a mock assault upon the defenses of Manila by the American troops, which was prearranged with the Spaniards, the city of Manila was surrendered to General Merritt August 13. The insurgent troops were not permitted by General Merritt to enter the city.

[NOTE.—The peace protocol provided that "the United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines."]

There is nothing in that stipulation inconsistent with the assumption that a conquest of the Philippines, or some part of them, had been designed by the Administration a considerable time before the war with Spain broke out. When Spain's appeal for terms of peace reached the President, July 26, General Merritt had reached Luzon only the day before, and it was obvious that he could do no more than take the city of Manila within the next few weeks. For the Administration to have declined to offer peace terms to Spain at that time would have been condemned by all the civilized world no less than by our own people.

Although General Merritt had not taken Manila when the peace protocol negotiations were in progress, the Administration achieved its ulterior purposes by indirection, namely, by the terminology of article 3 of the peace protocol, as quoted above. It secured the city of Manila by negotiations even before Merritt captured it, and it also secured an advantage in the protocol—the relegation of the whole question of "the control, disposition, and government" of the Philip-

pires to the treaty commissioners at Paris—which advantage Merritt was not able to gain by the terms of the capitulation under which Manila was surrendered by General Jaudenes. As will be seen later on, the President, when the permanent treaty of peace was under negotiation at Paris, set up a claim to the whole Philippine Archipelago, by right of conquest, and personally urged it with extraordinary persistency in private and public, although his treaty commissioners declined to accept his views, since they were not supported by international law.

It is a curious, and perhaps significant, fact that as early as July 1898, the Government of the United States thought it worth while to send a geologist and mineralogist to study the geology and mineral resources of the archipelago. See introduction by George F. Becker to the Report on the Geology of the Philippine Islands, published by the United States Geological Survey, Department of Interior, 1901, in which he says, on page 8:

In July, 1898, I was ordered to report to the military governor of the Philippines for duty as geologist, and I accompanied Gen. E. S. Otis to Manila. I remained in the Philippines fourteen months.

It may be asked, of what use was a geologist in waging war? He had no military value. Yet when he was sent out to the Philippines the American army had not even occupied the city of Manila. Obviously the geologist and mineralogist was sent out at that very early day to study the natural wealth of the islands, as his final report shows, and the step was entirely in harmony with the policy of territorial acquisition. Had there been no design of taking territory in the Philippines as a result of the war, then it is difficult to understand the reason for sending out a Government geologist.]

28.

Gen. E. S. Otis succeeds General Merritt in command, August 29, 1898.

29.

Insurgents, in response to General Otis's demands, evacuate the suburbs of Manila, September 15, 1898.

[NOTE.—There was controversy between General Otis and Aguinaldo as to the extent of the zone around Manila which the native forces should evacuate. (See General Otis's annual report of August 31, 1899, pp. 19-22.) General Otis finally admitted that Aguinaldo's claim that Pandacan was beyond the "suburbs" of Manila had been recognized by General Merritt. It followed that, under the Washington protocol, the American forces had no right to occupy the district of Pandacan. Aguinaldo, however, being threatened with the forcible removal of his men by the American army, withdrew from the district of Pandacan on October 25, and General Otis's forces occupied it. The armed collision on the night of February 4 took place in that same district of Pandacan.]

30.

Filipino Congress meets at Malolos, September 15, 1898.

31.

President McKinley, on September 16, 1898, instructs the American peace commissioners that "the United States can not accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon" in the coming peace settlement at Paris.

32.

Peace commissioners of United States and Spain meet at Paris, October 1, 1898.

33.

The President, on October 26, instructs his peace commissioners at Paris to demand the cession by Spain to the United States of the whole Philippine Archipelago.

34.

The President, on October 28, directs his commissioners not to yield the position that the Philippines "can be justly claimed by conquest."

35.

The President is informed, in a cablegram from Mr. Day, November 3, that "the majority of the commission are clearly of the opinion that our demand for the Philippine Islands can not be based on conquest."

36.

The President, on November 3, answers Mr. Day, declaring that "the destruction of the Spanish fleet on May 1 was the conquest of Manila, the capital of the Philippines," and assuming that the commissioners had not yielded the claim to the whole archipelago "by right of conquest."

37.

Commissioners at Paris, on November 4, again inform the President that the conquest claim is not valid or sound.

38.

The President, on November 5, accepts the peace commissioners' judgment in this matter.

39.

The Spanish commissioners, on November 28, 1898, accept American terms and agree to cede the Philippine Archipelago in consideration of the payment of \$20,000,000 by the United States.

[NOTE.—This transaction was afterwards described by Judge Day, chairman of the American commission, as a "purchase." (See his letter to D. K. Watson, of Columbus, Ohio, in October, 1899.)]

40.

Treaty of peace signed in Paris, December 10, 1898.

41.

Agoncillo, agent of the Filipino government in Paris, publishes a protest against the treaty, December 12, because it fails to recognize the independence of the Filipino nation.

42.

The President, in his message to Congress December 5, 1898, again advances the claim that the Philippine Archipelago had been conquered. Describing the operations, he writes:

The last scene of the war was enacted at Manila, its starting place. On August 13, after a brief assault upon the works by the land forces, * * * the capital surrendered unconditionally. * * * By this, the conquest of the Philippine Islands * * * was formally sealed.

43.

The President, on December 21, 1898, issues an order to General Otis directing him to extend, "with all possible dispatch," to the whole archipelago "the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila." He begins this order as follows:

The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein.

[NOTE.—The President's reassertion of the right to the Philippines by conquest in his annual message of December 5, and his order to Otis of December 21, took place within a few weeks after his treaty commissioners at Paris had notified him that the conquest claim was not valid and after he himself had yielded to their view, so far as framing the treaty was concerned. Now, if this extraordinary performance by the President be interpreted in the light of all that has gone before, dating from the instructions to Dewey in February, 1898, what is the reasonable conclusion the student of history must come to? Surely, he must first conclude that the President had the idea of a conquest of the Philippines deeply embedded in his mind, that the idea had been planted there sometime before the war with Spain began and that he persisted in holding to it even after the theory of conquest as a claim to territory had been abandoned by his treaty commissioners.

The final conclusion must be that the Administration had entertained the design of a permanent conquest of the Philippines or a part thereof as early as the late winter of 1897-98, when the situation in China and the situation in Cuba combined to direct the thoughts of statesmen to the possibilities of a war between the United States and Spain. This conclusion is strengthened, moreover, by the haste and prematureness of the order to General Otis to extend his territory over the whole archipelago. When this order was issued, December 21, 1898, the Paris treaty had not been ratified and none of the territory outside of Manila and its suburbs was yet in any sense subject to American jurisdiction. The order of December 21, therefore, was unlawful and a clear usurpation of power by the Executive in order to occupy with his military forces, at the earliest possible moment, territory which he claimed on a false basis. It is clear that the Chief Executive's mind was saturated with the idea of conquest.

44.

The President on December 23, 1898, orders that United States troops be sent to occupy the city of Iloilo in the island of Panay.

45.

The Spanish General Rios, on December 24, 1898, surrenders Iloilo to the armed forces of the Malolos government, which thereupon takes possession of the place and maintains law and order.

46.

American force, under command of Gen. M. P. Miller, reaches Iloilo Harbor on December 28, 1898. General Miller demands the surrender of the city.

47.

The "federal government of the Visayas" refuses, December 30, to surrender Iloilo to General Miller. Iloilo merchants petition General Miller not to attack.

48.

General Otis, on December 29, sends to General Miller, by a British cruiser, a copy of the President's proclamation of December 21, ordering the immediate extension of American authority over the entire archipelago. In a note to General Miller, accompanying the President's proclamation, General Otis writes:

You can remain in the harbor with your forces. If you meet with decided or strong opposition, await there further instructions, and, if necessary, I can direct a portion of your force to other ports in the southern islands, where you will not meet much, if any, opposition.

[NOTE.—This proves that General Otis already contemplated executing the President's order of December 21 at once by diverting some of General Miller's troops to the more southern islands.]

49.

General Miller, on January 1, 1899, sends a verbatim and true copy of the President's proclamation or order of December 21 to the native authorities in Iloilo, and, at the same time, asks that they withdraw the native army and allow his troops to enter the city. In a letter to the native authorities General Miller tells them:

As indicated in the President's cablegram, under existing conditions, the people of Panay Island owe obedience to the political authority of the United States.

He also directs their attention specifically to that portion of the President's proclamation ordering the extension "with all possible dispatch" of the United States military rule over the whole archipelago.

50.

The native authorities of Iloilo, on January 9, 1899, acknowledged the receipt of the verbatim copy of the President's proclamation, but refused to surrender the city.

[NOTE.—The special historical significance of the Iloilo expedition is

that it actually and physically began the war between the United States and Filipinos and marks the United States Government, under the personal direction of President McKinley, as the aggressor in that war. When General Miller appeared with a strong military and naval force in Iloilo Harbor and demanded the surrender of the city by the native authorities, who acknowledged allegiance to the Malolos government, he committed an act of war upon that government. When he sent to the Iloilo authorities the President's order directing the immediate extension of American military rule over the whole archipelago he gave notice to the native Filipino government of what was unequivocally an act of war by the President of the United States. We only need to apply these facts to other conditions to understand their true import. If the Emperor of Germany should order his generals to extend German authority over France "with all possible dispatch," the French would be justified in regarding the order as a declaration of war.

There has been considerable controversy as to whether President Kreuger, of the South African Republic, was justified in issuing his ultimatum to the British Government. No human being would contend that Mr. Kreuger would not have been justified in regarding as the first act of an invasion, and, therefore, as an act of war, an order by the British Government directing its general in South Africa to extend at once British authority over the Transvaal. In the Philippines, in addition to such an order, there was a formal demand by an American general, commanding a military and naval force, for the surrender of a city occupied by the native government. These acts by the President of the United States and an American general were committed at a time when the United States had no shadow of legal jurisdiction over any part of the Philippines, outside of Manila Bay, the city of Manila and its suburbs, as was afterwards admitted by the President, McKinley himself, in a speech at Pittsburg, Pa., August 28, 1899, when he said:

Until the treaty was ratified we had no authority beyond Manila, city, bay, and harbor.

Now, the treaty did not pass the United States Senate until February 6, 1899, a full month after General Miller's demand for the surrender of Iloilo, and the ratifications were not exchanged between Spain and the United States, the act which alone gave any legal force to the treaty, until April 11, 1899. So far as the Filipino people and their government *de facto* were concerned, the proclamation of December 21, 1898, and General Miller's demand for the surrender of Iloilo were acts of aggression—acts of war—notwithstanding that the Malolos government had not been officially recognized by any of the powers and had no acknowledged international standing. The fact that actual bloodshed did not begin until February 4, 1899, in no wise invalidates the fact that an aggressive war was begun by the United States Government a full month at least before that date.]

51.

General Otis, on January 4, 1899, issues the President's proclamation of December 21, in a new form, revised by himself, so as to omit the passages most offensive to the feelings of the Filipino people.

[NOTE.—This step on General Otis's part was unavailing; first, because even in the amended form the proclamation indicated the

immediate assumption by the United States of full authority over the whole archipelago; second, because the literal version had already been published broadcast by General Miller in Iloilo, whence it was communicated to the headquarters of the native government at Malolos, the telegraph lines of the archipelago being at that time under the control of the natives.]

52.

Aguinaldo, on January 5, 1899, issues a counter proclamation and protest.

[NOTE.—Aguinaldo, in issuing this proclamation, was cognizant of the acts of war that had already been committed by the United States Government, for he said:

My government can not remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory.]

53.

General Otis, on January 9, 1899, appoints a commission of army officers, General Hughes, Colonel Smith, and Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder, to meet a commission of three appointed by Aguinaldo, in conformity with Aguinaldo's request "to confer with regard to the situation of affairs."

[NOTE.—Nothing came of this joint commission's meeting. General Otis, in his official report of August 31, 1899, said:

They (Filipino commissioners) beg for some tangible concession from the United States Government—one which they could present to the people and which might serve to allay the excitement. Nothing could be accomplished without the sacrifice of some of the attributes of sovereignty (by the United States), and certainly that could not be done by any existing authority.

General Otis added:

Finally the conference became the object of insurgent suspicion.

That was true. On January 17, 1899, the *Independencia*, the organ of the Malolos government, printed an editorial in which the following appeared:

The Filipinos are disillusioned, and believe that the appointment of this commission is for nothing more than to gain time and allow the arrival of more forces (from the United States).]

54.

Fighting between the American and Filipino armies begins around Manila February 4, 1899, continuing February 5. Filipinos defeated and driven back after suffering very severe losses. General Otis reported:

Their loss was estimated at 3,000, and, considering the number who died upon the field of battle, might be deemed conservative.

[NOTE.—General Aguinaldo was in Malolos, 18 miles away, when the battle of Manila took place, and it is conceded on all sides that no attack on the American lines that night had been ordered by Aguinaldo or any of his generals. General Otis, in his official report, said:

It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the initiative.

The armed collision on the night of February 4 was clearly unpremeditated. A Filipino, trespassing on territory then held by the

American army, was shot and killed by an American sentry, Private Grayson, of the Nebraska Volunteers. From this "first shot" further fighting developed between the outposts of the two confronting armies, until after about one hour and a half the engagement became general along the whole line. There was no deliberate "attack" by either army; the situation had become so strained, however, since the acts of war committed by the President of the United States in his proclamation of December 21, and by General Miller in demanding the surrender of Iloilo, that a general battle was easily precipitated when the collision at the Nebraska outpost occurred. It is altogether probable that the generals on both sides had prepared plans of attack for some future date, since, under the circumstances prevailing, the preparation of such plans was simply a part of the professional business of a general in command. Especially natural would it have been for Aguinaldo to have prepared plans of attack on Manila, since acts of war had already been committed against his government by the Government of the United States.

On the other hand, General Otis must have attacked the Filipino army around Manila whenever he had set out to establish American authority over Luzon. All points concerning "what might have been" aside, the essential facts as they took place are as follows: The United States Government committed acts of war in the President's proclamation of December 21 and the expedition to Iloilo, which the Filipino government, according to all civilized usage, would have been completely justified in treating as the initiation and the declaration of war, yet the Filipino government refrained from any warlike act in reprisal calculated to precipitate actual fighting; and actual fighting having accidentally broken out, the Filipino authorities, as is conceded by the American general, had wished at least to postpone it until a later and more opportune time. It is clear, therefore, that the Filipinos did not initiate the war. It is clear, also, that the primary responsibility for that war is deeply rooted in the policy of conquest which has been traced back through the acts of the administration of President McKinley to a period prior to the war with Spain. The President was now face to face with the logical result of his policy, which was a prolonged and sanguinary war for the actual conquest of the people of the Philippine Archipelago.]

55.

Treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, under which Spain ceded her rights in the Philippine Archipelago, passes the United States Senate February 6, 1899.

[NOTE.—This treaty would not have passed the Senate had not news of the battle of Manila reached Washington before the vote was taken. The change of two votes would have defeated the treaty, and there were two opposition Senators—Jones, of Nevada, and McLaurin, of South Carolina—who declared in the Senate that they voted aye because of the outbreak of hostilities. It was represented at that time in this country that the Filipino army had "attacked" the American lines.]

56.

Battle of Caloocan February 10, Filipinos to the number of about 4,000 being defeated, with heavy losses.

57.

General Miller bombards Iloilo February 11, and takes the city.

58.

The Schurman commission reaches Manila March 4.

59.

First northern campaign for the conquest of Luzon, under General MacArthur's immediate command, begins March 24.

60.

Malolos, Filipino government's first capital, occupied by General MacArthur March 31.

61.

The Schurman commission issues a proclamation to the Filipino people April 4. Recites the American claim to full sovereignty over the archipelago and the American purposes.

62.

General Lawton captures Santa Cruz of La Laguna Province April 10.

63.

General Lawton captures San Isidro, 65 miles north of Manila, May 17.

[NOTE.—General Lawton abandoned both Santa Cruz and San Isidro soon after occupying them.]

64.

Filipinos attack MacArthur's line at San Fernando, whither he had advanced from Malolos, but are repulsed, with heavy loss, May 24.

[NOTE.—While MacArthur held his advanced position at San Fernando, Lawton was ordered to retreat, and thus Lawton's turning movement proved unsuccessful.]

65.

Lawton, June 2, starts on an expedition to the east and takes the towns of Morong and Antipolo.

[NOTE.—Not much of this territory was held long as the result of this expedition.]

66.

Lawton, June 7, ordered to move south from Manila with about 4,000 men. He takes Calamba and Los Baños on Laguna Bay and occupies the territory south as far as Imus.

67.

Filipinos attack MacArthur again, June 15, at San Fernando, and are again defeated.

[NOTE.—The rainy season had now begun and there was no further campaigning of consequence by the American army until the autumn.]

68.

Treaty with the Sultan of Jolo, commonly known as the Sultan of the Sulu Islands, negotiated by General Bates and signed on August 20, 1899.

[NOTE.—This treaty recognized slavery in the Sulu Islands and stipulated that the Sultan and his chief subordinates should be paid monthly pensions or salaries by the United States.]

69.

Second northern campaign by American forces begins in October, 1899. MacArthur marches up the railroad October 22.

[NOTE.—The general plan of this campaign was as follows: MacArthur to move north to Dagupan, Lawton to go east to San Jose, Young to proceed from San Jose to the northwest, and Wheaton, coming down from the northern seacoast at San Fabian, to effect a junction with Young. Thus the Filipino army, with its leaders, was to be hemmed in and the war ended. The campaign, while well conceived, did not succeed in ending the war, because, owing to rains and transportation difficulties, the enveloping movements could not be accomplished in time to prevent the Filipinos in arms from escaping east and still farther north into the mountains.]

70.

MacArthur's troops captured Tarlac, Filipino capital, November 12, 1899.

71.

Filipino leaders hold a council of war November 13, at Bayambang, and decide to disband the organized army, which was "incapable of further resistance in the field," and resort to guerrilla warfare.

72.

General MacArthur enters Bayambang, last capital of the Filipino government, November 19.

[NOTE.—The Filipino government was now entirely disrupted except in so far as Aguinaldo, who remained in the field for over a year thereafter, directed the guerrilla warfare.]

73.

General Lawton killed December 18, 1899, south of Manila, on the first day of an expedition to strike Filipino forces in the southern provinces of Luzon.

74.

Engagement at Cavite Viejo January 7, 1900. Native force annihilated.

75.

General Otis is succeeded as military governor and commander of the American Army by General MacArthur May 5, 1900.

76.

Expedition under Major March starts from Manila to run down Aguinaldo May 6, 1900.

[NOTE.—This expedition was unsuccessful.]

77.

The Taft Commission arrives in Manila June 3, 1900.

78.

General MacArthur issues a proclamation of amnesty June 21, 1900, to all who renounce the Filipino aspiration for nationality and accept American sovereignty.

[NOTE.—Throughout the summer and autumn of 1900 guerrilla warfare continued. After the reelection of President McKinley, in November, 1900, there was a marked revival of the guerrilla warfare, and a complete failure of the prediction of the Taft Commission that war would end sixty days after McKinley's reelection.]

79.

The federal party, organized under inspiration of the Taft Commission and composed of natives disposed to be reconciled to American authority, issues a manifesto to the Filipino people December 25, 1900.

80.

General Delgado, Filipino leader in Panay, surrenders January 11, 1901.

81.

The Spooner amendment, so called, conferring upon the President substantially absolute power to govern the Philippines and other islands, passes the United States Congress in February, 1901, and becomes a law by March 3, 1901.

82.

Capture of Aguinaldo through methods not sanctioned by the laws of war, March 23, 1901, by General Funston.

83.

Aguinaldo takes the oath of allegiance to the United States April 2, and on April 19 there is issued an address signed by him advising his compatriots in the struggle for Filipino nationality and independence to accept American rule.

84.

General MacArthur is succeeded by General Chaffee as military governor and commander of the American army on July 4, 1901, and Judge Taft on the same date assumes the office of civil governor of the archipelago under the authority of the Secretary of War.

NOTE.—General MacArthur, in his last annual report, dated July 4, 1901, pronounced the military conquest of the Philippine Archipelago substantially complete. He said in a kind of retrospect:

The presence of America in these islands is simply one of the results, in logical sequence, of great material prosperity.

That is to say, their acquisition was due to commercial and not to humanitarian or accidental or providential causes. The acquisition of the islands was a deliberate conquest, having its conception in the commercial phases of the Chinese situation of 1897-98. And that it was purely a military conquest, which trampled upon the aspirations and sentiments of the bulk of the Filipino people, even as the extinction of Poland and the destruction of the South African Republics violated the dearest traditions of nationality held by the inhabitants of those unhappy countries—that point is clearly conceded in another passage of the same MacArthur report; for, after reviewing the military situation in the Philippines on July 4, 1901, General MacArthur said:


It is respectfully submitted that the very gratifying conditions herein briefly recapitulated have not been brought about entirely by the hand of Providence, neither must the attitude of the people who have declared for peace, or even that of the leaders of the Federal party, be attributed entirely to unreserved pro-Americanism. It would, therefore, be unsafe to assume these conservative forces as constant factors, the friendly operation of which can be relied upon, irrespective of external influences. * * * The holding force in the islands must be a well-organized army and navy. Anything in the immediate future calculated to reduce the efficiency of these instruments will not only be a menace to the present, but put in jeopardy the entire future of American possibilities in the archipelago.

()

5 Dec 35/5, 57 Aug 17 Sa
42 45'









LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Branch Bindery, 1903

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 009 784 675 3